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Abstract 
As the name already states, the present article proposes to analyze the advancement of Japan’s FDI, caused by the yen’s 
strong appreciation (after the Plaza Accord-1985). The increasing of the Japan’s currency and the disputes with western 
states, caused by the trade surplus, made the aggressive export policy harder to accomplish. Therefore, they had to find a 
new paradigm of growth, which could provide a sustained economic development. They tried to expand the investments 
abroad, which were considered the adequate solution at that time. The aim of this study is to analyze the evolution of the 
FDI, its allocation by regions/countries, by sectors (manufacturing, nonmanufacturing ones) and also the consequences on 
the Japanese economy. 
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1. Methodology 
     Regarding the methodology of the paper, I tried to present two intersecting perspectives. Besides the 
economic approach, there will be a short reference to the historic one. The economic view, which is the most 
important and renown, is assisted by the others that are using it to better explain the flexibility and the dynamic 
character of the Japanese economy, before and after the economic crisis of Japan. 
     Of all scientific methods and procedures, this article will especially include the analysis and the synthesis. 
Both have been used to analyze foreign direct investments (FDI) in Japan in the period succeeding the Plaza 
Accord.  
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     The interpretation of the charts will be divided in two periods: before the Great Japanese Crisis (1982-1990), 
and the following years (1991-2013). 
     Regarding the scientific documentation of this paper, after verifying the sources, I have gathered the data, 
studied the documents and followed out with the charts for highlighting and making the analysis easier, at the 
end all these have been used for the draw up of the present article.  
2. Literature review 
     The literature with reference to the Japanese FDI is vast. Ozawa Teramoto, describes in more articles, the 
catch-up model called the “flying-geese” who supported the rise of Japan,. Regarding the relations with the 
United States and China are distinguished some empirical studies: Shinji Tagaki & Zhongying Shi wrote about 
the Japanese investment in Asia (1987-2008) and especially in China; Cheng  Saoming created an empirical 
model to examinte the  changes for the Japanese capital because of the reorientation of chinese development 
strategy to interior area from the coast; Salike Nimesh  made a panel to observe the fact that the Japanese FDI 
in China took a considerable spring.  
3. Introduction 
     Shattered to pieces after The Second World War, Japan managed to become in 1968, due to a 10 years plan 
of doubling the national income (achieved in 7 years) the third world economic power. After only five years, 
the country hit another obstacle: the first petrol shock. The fast pace of the petrol’s price growth (from 2,18 
dollars in 1971 to 11,65 dollars in January 1974) drastically affected Japan’s economy, who was a great 
consumer of such resources. The Japanese quickly realized that they had to adapt and acted accordingly: Japan 
started to give up on the great industries, starting to specialize on those with a higher added value, achieving 
better economic performances than other developed countries.  
As a consequence of the first oil shock, being poor in natural resources, the country’s imports bill 
grew exponentially and the Japanese market was close to saturation, the only option left was to take by storm 
the external markets in order to succeed in equilibrating the commercial balance sheet. Outside the border sales 
grew significantly (for example, if at the beginning of the ‘60s Japan was exporting 7.000 cars in 1980 the 
country was exporting 3.9 million cars) and Japan’s burst could not be stopped by the commercial partners 
who’s deficits grew deeper (the ratio between the U.S. and Japan was over 50 billion dollars in 1986).  
     The remarkable performance achieved by Japan in "its golden decade of exports" could not let the powerful 
western countries just sit by, as they saw their economic growth being  threatened, they had a constantly 
increasing unemployment rate, an amplification of mass pressure, etc. Thereby, the middle of the nineteenth 
century would bring the signing of the Plazza agreement, and with it, Endaka, representing a significant 
appreciation of the yen. 
     As we can see in Figure 1, if at the beginning of 1985 one U.S. dollar amounted to 260 yen, its value soon 
dropped towards 130. Therefore, with a doubling of the value of the yen, Japan suffered in terms of 
competitiveness, and moreover, it had to deal with an extremly important aspect, namely the ” self-limiting of 
exports”. Subjected to significant pressure from the Western countries, the Japanese archipelago had to accept a 
more limited export of cars to the United States and Europe (specifically France).   
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Source:  http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/STLFSI/downloaddata?cid=3457 
Fig.1. Exchange rate evolution of the dollar, compared with the yen, the French franc, the German mark and the British pound: 1981-1990 
 
     After initialing the agreement on the "voluntary restraint" of exports mentioned in the previous paragraph, a 
resigned Seiichi Yamashita from Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic Development) stated:”We 
are at a turning point. Our partners in the United States and the Common Market give increasingly harsher 
criticism on the expansion of our exports, showing that we are creating difficulties for them in balancing the 
payments balance and in unemployment absorption. We must now adopt another strategy where the primary 
focus shifts from exports of manufactured goods to exports of capital and technology towards developed 
countries”.          
Therefore, the Japanese dignitary announced Japan’s entry into a new era: one of capital export and of 
direct investments abroad using a comparative advantage recycling to attempt an industrial and market 
recycling. Accumulated capital surplus at the time, coupled with the appreciation of the yen, allowed the 
Japanese to overcome the tariff and non tariff barriers imposed by Westerners, by implanting production units 
precisely in this region of the globe.  
Besides this advantage, this decision granted Japan three more benefits: first, it increased its financial 
benefits, second, it maintained its ethnic and cultural homogeneity by not importing immigrants to work in their 
country, and third, it compensated for the reduced surface of the territory (Gibney, 1996, 135). Regarding the 
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stages of Nippon foreign direct investment, as Ozawa Teramoto (Teramoto, 2001, 4) showed, they passed 
through several stages: searching for low wages, discovering resources, components, accessories, seeking 
alliances. 
     The goal of the Nippon companies was to maintain their market shares, even if they could not export. With 
the help of FDIs, they were producing directly in the markets where they were installed. In general, the 
Japanese market was trying to produce inside the borders; and the “outside” production was therefore the 
programmed extension of the one within national territory.  
As shown in Figure 2, we can observe that after a relatively linear evolution in 1982 - 1985, 1986 
brought a boom in Nippon foreign direct investment, marking a relative increase of 82.67% over the previous 
year. 1987 followed the same trend, marking a relative increase of 49.48%.  
This was the annual relative increase margin of Japanese FDIs, until 1990, when, as a result of 
challenging imbalances in the Japanese archipelago, it started to follow a negative trend. In 1985-1989 foreign 
direct investment registered an increase of over 450%, thus confirming the new era Japan was entering.  
Japanese transnational had the highest rate of global investment in ‘90s. We can note, as Shinji Takagi and 
Zongying Shi concluded (Shinji & Zongying, 2011), the Japanese FDI to Asia was very little affected. 
     With the beginning of the Japanese crisis one can observe a decrease of Foreign Direct Investments that 
lasted more than a decade, this trend reversed only in 2006 (surpassing the level of FDI in 1989 only after 17 
years). The subprime crisis’s consequences can also be seen at this chapter, in two years the amount assigned to 
the FDIs lowering with almost 60%, than a change of scenery can be seen. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of Japanese foreign direct investment: 1981 -2013* 
(million dollars)
 
Source: http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ 
Fig.2. Evolution of Japanese foreign direct investment: 1981 -2013 (million dollars)  
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Source: http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ 
Fig. 3. Evolution of Japanese foreign direct investment broken down by sectors: manufacturing and non manufacturing: 1981-2013* 
(million dollars) – 2013 estimated value 
     Figure 3 shows the fact that the nonmanufacturing sector took a considerable spring, growing with almost 
1000% in half a decade, before The Great Japanese Crisis. Same aspect can be noticed before the subprime 
crisis, when between 2006 and 2008 the FDIs grew with almost 500% almost like a premonition that something 
was about to happen in the world of international finances.  These aspects are not to be neglected and they say a 
lot about the role of financial speculations regarding economic crisis outbursts. In 2011, as a consequence of 
the international financial cool off, the foreign direct investments in manufacturing softly exceeded the 
nonmanufacturing ones.  
     The manufacturing sector had a growing course until 1989, maintaining almost the same level until 2004, 
than started an accelerated growth until the outburst of the economic crisis.  
5. Japanese foreign direct investments by continent / country 
     As shown in Figure 4, and as expected, Japanese investments were mainly directed to the North American 
continent, their share ranging between 40-50% of total in 1985-1990. The second destination of Japanese 
capital was the Old Continent, with a share of 20%, followed by Asia. Thus, a series of Japanese products 
“made in USA”,”made in Germany” etc., appeared on the market. 
     After almost two decades in which the North American continent represented the main partner Japanese 
investments would go to, this tendency changed at the end of the 90s, Europe taking its place. Japan focuses its 
attention on west European markets.  
     As we can observe in Figure 4, of the three main partners only Asia’s share was decreasing, which shows 
that most of the financial resources were directed towards North America and Europe, who had 
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imposed”voluntary restraints”, and where they had to produce in order to maintain their market shares; 
therefore, the share of both continents was maintained, with a continuous growth during the studied period.  
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Source: own calculations by http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ 
Fig. 4. Comparative analysis of Japanese foreign direct investment share in North America, Europe and Asia: 1981-2013* -2013-estimated 
value  
 
    Regarding the Asian partners, these have occupied the third position in Japan’s FDIs top for almost the entire 
analyzed period of time. The cheap labor force found in the neighboring countries was losing its appeal, as 
Japan was rather searching for strategic partnerships or maintaining markets which were obtained with 
difficulty and which generated important profits. Moreover, a very rapid financial expansion would have been 
frowned upon in Asian views, who were already remembering the Mutual Prosperity Area before World War 
II. 
     With regard to the evolution of Japanese FDIs in North America, it practically merges with the United 
States, which has a share of 95-98% of the total FDI in the continent. Japanese economic surpluses were 
channeled toward this country and at some point it seemed like Japan was trying to buy the whole. Investments 
were directed towards all sectors, but the large amounts were channeled towards the financial world, and Japan 
became the second largest external player (after Great Britain). 
     A more detailed analysis of Japanese FDIs directed towards Europe shows that the main destinations in 
1981-2013 were, in order, Great Britain, Holland and Germany.  
     Generally, the financial resources directed toward the first two countries represented financial investments 
(30% of loans in the UK were provided by Japanese banks), while in Germany the amounts were directed 
towards the manufacturing sector, particularly towards the automotive industry. 
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Fig.5. Comparative analysis of Japanese foreign investments in the UK, Netherlands and Germany: 1981-2013* (in million dollars) -2013 
estimated value 
     Regarding the Asian destination for Japanese FDI, we can find the main partner countries in Figure 6. They 
would relocate the industries with low added value in Japan that were renounced since 1985. It concerns in 
particular the textiles, shoes and so on industries, because of the cheap labor force available in these countries. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparative analysis of Japanese foreign direct investment in Hong Kong, Singapore and China: 1981-2013* (in million dollars) 
2013 - estimated values 
 
     We can also notice the rise of foreign direct investment in China, after “the opening” of this country. From 
226 million dollars in 1986 the amount of 165 million dollars was reached in 1990 and to 13500 in 2012. 
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“China effect” (Salike, 2010) was a win-win situation for both countries: Japan would take advantage of the 
cheep work force and of the close geographic position to China, while the second would develop with the 
amount of money that came from the Japanese (for more information see (Shaoming & Stough, 2006),  (Cheng, 
2008)).  
6. The evolution of Japanese economic growth between 1981-2013 
     At an economic growth level, Japan has felt the Endaka shock in 1986, until it managed to devise a new 
strategy, posting an advance of only 2.5%.  Afterwards followed the years of 1987 and 1988 that brought more 
than satisfactory figures of over 4% respectively over 6% growth.  In 1989 and 1990 the growth level went up 
with almost 5% (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/03.htm). 
     When analyzing Japanese growth in the above mentioned period it is interesting to also note its performance 
relative to other economies. Japan registered an advance of nearly 50% than both the United States and Great 
Britain, which once again demonstrates the power of the Japanese archipelago on that period 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx). 
     Due to the crisis at the end of the 80s, Japan could no longer achieve the economic growth it used to after 
the second World War, on the contrary alongside the recessions the country struggled with, by the end of the 
1990-2000 period, it had an average growth rate of only 1%, this period being called by many “the lost 
decade”.  In 1996 when Japan shown signs of a positive comeback the country got struck by the 1997 Asian 
Crisis. The  beginning of the third millennium did not bring great changes, financial improvements could only 
be seen in 2005-2006, but shortly after the subprime depression came out fatally injuring the Japanese economy 
(a 5% decrease in 2008). This was the first time, since the World Wars, when Japan could not adapt and was 
unable to produce significant economical increase (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/03.htm). 
7. Conclusions 
     After the World Wars, the Japanese economy was able to cope with all challenges, proving itself to be 
adaptable and dynamic. Same thing happened when due to the signing of the Plaza agreement and the 
significant appreciation of the yen, Japan was losing its export competitiveness which helped her succeeded so 
amazingly in the decade before. If we add to this the decision to "restraint" the exports, the only solution the 
Japanese had at that time was to increase the FDI, the value of which increased by over 450% only between 
1985 and 1989. 
     In terms of distribution by industry note that throughout the period under review the non-manufacturing 
system has exceeded the manufacturing one, but the number of the latter one increased rapidly by almost 600% 
in just 4 years especially after the Plaza agreement; And so the production in markets where products are 
consumed has began. 
     By analyzing the distribution of Japanese foreign direct investments by regions, we note that the amounts 
allocated to the North American continent (which absorb roughly half at global level) have grown 
exponentially, the amounts allocated in 1989 being more than 5 times larger than the amounts of 1985. The 
following partner was represented by Europe, absorbing more about 20% of the total Japanese worldwide 
investments and who registered in its turn an increase of over 600% in the above-mentioned period. We can 
note that it is on these two richest continents, where the Japanese ware faced with a multitude of export 
barriers, that they decided to prodoce, directly on the territory of the consumer states. While there they were 
investing with the aim of maintaining or increasing the market shares, in Asia (the third Japanese partner), the 
main goal was to seize raw materials, but also to use the cheap labor force. 
     As we have seen, in regard to economic growth, although affected during the year when the Plaza 
Agreement was signed, Japan was able to overcome this impediment, recording a net advantage over other 
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international powers, such as the United States or Great Britain. Thereby, Japan was able, for the thrid time in 
the postwar period, to transform a disadvantage in an advantage. 
     Unfortunately for Japan, after an economic period when the country seemed to be taking over the world,  
starting with the late 80s crisis, it got into a shadow in which it seems to be struggling up to this day, without 
being able to pull itself back into the light. Due to the unfavorable international environment (the 1997 Asian 
crisis and the 2008 world crisis) Japan does not manage to find the key to resolve the problems of its economy. 
If between 1952 and 1989 the country represented the ideal example to follow, regarding economic 
accomplishments, after this period Japan embodied the incapacity of development. 
    I want to notice also the fact that the nonmanufacturing sector took a considerable spring, before The Great 
Japanese Crisis growing with almost 1000% in five years. This aspect can be observed also before the subprime 
crisis, when in only 2 years the FDIs grew with almost 500%. Those show the link between financial 
speculations- economic crisis outbursts and could be an indicator who can help us to detect new crisis.  
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